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NOTES
TAX LAW-THE 1984 AMENDMENT TO I.RC. § IS2(e): DID CON
GRESS INTEND TO PREEMPT A STATE COURT'S AUTHORITY TO AL
LOCATE THE DEPENDENT CHILD EXEMPTION?

INTRODUCTION
Internal Revenue Code ("I.RC.") § lS1(c)(1)(B)1 grants an indi
vidual taxpayer a tax deductible, personal exemption2 for each de
pendent child. In the case of divorced or legally. separated parents,
I.RC. § IS2(e)3 provides a "support test" to determine which parent
is entitled to the dependent child exemption. 4 Prior to its amendment
in 1984,s state courts generally interpreted section IS2(e)6 as providing
a state court with the authority to allocate the dependency exemption
to either the custodial parent or the noncustodial parent when decid
ing family support and child custody matters. 7 Indeed, in its prior
form section IS2(e) expressly permitted state courts, through a decree
of divorce or separate maintenance, to allocate the exemption to either
the custodial or the noncustodial parent. 8 However, section IS2(e),9 in
its amended form, contains no specific language that would permit a
1. I.R.C. § 151(c)(I)(B) (1988).
2. An "exemption" is defined as "an amount allowed as a deduction from adjusted
gross income in arriving at taxable income." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 571-72 (6th ed.
1990).
3. See I.R.C. § 152(e) (1988).

4.

Id.

5. Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 423(a), 98 Stat. 494, 799-800
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 152(e) (1988».
6. See Act of Aug. 31, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-78, 81 Stat. 191, amended by Tax Re
form Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, sec. 2139, § 152(e)(2)(B)(i), 90 Stat. 1520, 1932
(current version at I.R.C. § 152(e) (1988».
7. In re Marriage of Einhorn, 533 N.E.2d 29, 36 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
8. See Act of Aug. 31, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-78, § 152(e)(2)(A)(i), 81 Stat. 191, 191
92 (current version at I.R.C. § 152(e) (1988»; see also Amanda S. Bornhorst, Note, Custo
dial Parent Dependency Exemptions: Hughes v. Hughes,S AKRON TAX J. 233, 233 (1988)
(stating that the pre-1984 amendment version of § 152(e) "clearly acknowledged the juris
diction of state courts to award the [dependency exemption] to the noncustodial parent").
9. I.R.C. § 152(e) (1988).
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state court to allocate the dependent child exemption. As a result,
some state courts have held that they no longer possess the authority
to allocate the exemption.lO Moreover, because section 152(e) specifi
cally allocates the exemption to the custodial parent, 1 1 some courts
have asserted that a state court is now preempted 12 from allocating the
exemption to noncustodial parents. 13
Conversely, other state courts have maintained that the changes
to section 152(e) have not preempted their authority to allocate the
dependent child exemption. I4 Despite the automatic allocation of the
exemption to the custodial parent, these courts have asserted that they
may allocate the exemption to the noncustodial parent by ordering the
custodial parent to release his or her claim to the exemption. Section
152(e) provides that a noncustodial parent may claim the dependency
exemption if the custodial parent releases his or her claim to the ex
emption. IS However, the statute is silent as to whether a state court
may order such a release. Consequently, state courts disagree as to
10. See Holley v. Holley, 547 So. 2d 192 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Blanchard v.
Blanchard, 401 S.E.2d 714 (Ga. 1991); Varga v. Varga, 434 N.W.2d 152 (Mich. Ct. App.
1988); Bennett v. Bennett, 528 N.Y.S.2d 103 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988); Gleason v. Mich
litsch, 728 P.2d 965 (Or. Ct. App. 1986); Josey v. Josey, 351 S.E.2d 891 (S.C. Ct. App.
1986); Brandriet v. Larsen, 442 N.W.2d 455 (S.D. 1989); Sarver v. Dathe, 439 N.W.2d 548
(S.D. 1989).
II. See I.R.C. § 152(e)(I) (1988).
12. In this context, preemption means that federal law will override state law. See
JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9.1 (3d ed. 1986).
13. See Blanchard v. Blanchard, 401 S.E.2d 714 (Ga. 1991); Varga v. Varga, 434
N.W.2d 152 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988); Gleason v. Michlitsch, 728 P.2d 965 (Or. Ct. App.
1986); Brandriet v. Larsen, 442 N.W.2d 455 (S.D. 1989); Sarver v. Dathe, 439 N.W.2d 548
(S.D. 1989).
14. See Gamble v. Gamble, 562 So. 2d 1343 (Ala. Ct. App. 1990); Lincoln v. Lin
coln, 746 P.2d 13 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987); In re Marriage of Beyer, 789 P.2d 468 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1989); Serrano v. Serrano, 566 A.2d 413 (Conn. 1989); Rohr v. Rohr, 800 P.2d 85
(Idaho 1990); In re Marriage of Rogliano, 555 N.E.2d 1114 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); In re
Marriage of Baker, 550 N.E.2d 82 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990); In re Marriage of Dawson, 467
N.W.2d 271 (Iowa 1991); In re Marriage of Clingan, No. 62,431, 1989 Kan. App. LEXIS
206 (Mar. 24, 1989); Hart v. Hart, 774 S.W.2d 455 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989); Boudreau v.
Boudreau, 563 So. 2d 1244 (La. Ct. App. 1990); Wassifv. Wassif, 551 A.2d 935 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App.), cert. denied, 556 A.2d 674 (Md. 1989); Bailey v. Bailey, 540 N.E.2d 187
(Mass. App. Ct. 1989); In re Marriage of Ley, No. C2-90-1121, 1990 Minn. App. LEXIS
906 (Sept. 12, 1990); Nichols v. Tedder, 547 So. 2d 766 (Miss. 1989); Vohsen v. Vohsen,
801 S.W.2d 789 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991); In re Marriage of Milesnick, 765 P.2d 751 (Mont.
1988); Babka v. Babka, 452 N.W.2d 286 (Neb. 1990); Gwodz v. Gwodz, 560 A.2d 85 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989); Fleck v. Fleck, 427 N.W.2d 355 (N.D. 1988); Bobo v. Jewell,
528 N.E.2d 180 (Ohio 1988); Motes v. Motes, 786 P.2d 232 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), cert.
denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990); In re Marriage of Peacock, 771 P.2d 767 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1989); Cross V. Cross, 363 S.E.2d 449 (W. Va. 1987); Pergolski V. Pergoiski, 420
N.W.2d 414 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988).
15. I.R.C. § 152(e)(2) (1988).
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whether section 152(e) now preempts a state court from allocating the
exemption to the noncustodial parent by ordering the custodial parent
to execute a release of the exemption.
This Note contrasts two recent cases, Sarver v. Dathe 16 and Ser
rano v. Serrano,t7 in an attempt to determine whether section 152(e)
now preempts a state court from allocating the dependent child ex
emption. Section I sets forth the pre-1984 and post-1984 amendment
provisions of section 152(e). Section II examines Sarver v. Dathe,
which held that section 152(e) now preempts a state court's authority
to allocate the dependent child exemption. Section III examines Ser
rano v. Serrano, which held that section 152(e), in its amended form,
does not preempt a state court's authority to allocate the exemption.
Lastly, Section IV analyzes and contrasts Sarver and Serrano. Section
IV concludes that Sarver correctly suggests that a state court's alloca
tion of the dependency exemption does major damage to Congress'
intention of conferring a tax benefit upon custodial parents. Conse
quently, section 152(e), as amended, preempts a state court from allo
cating the dependent child exemption.
I.

1.R.e. § 152(e)

1.R.e. § 151(c)(1)(B)IS establishes that a taxpayer may claim as a
deduction an exemption amount l9 for each dependent child. 20 In the
case of divorced or legally separated parents, I.R.C. § 152(e) provides
a "support test" to determine which parent is entitled to the dependent
child exemption. 21 The support test seeks to resolve whether the cus
todial or the noncustodial parent has contributed more than half of the
support received by the child during the taxable year.22 The parent
deemed to have contributed that amount is permitted, under I.R.C.
§ 152(a), to treat the child as his or her dependent. 23 Section
151(c)(1 )(B) allows this parent to claim an exemption for the
dependent. 24
16. 439 N.W.2d 548 (S.D. 1989).
17. 566 A.2d 413 (Conn. 1989).
18. I.R.C. § 151(c)(I)(B) (1988).
19. See id. § 151(d).
20. For purposes of § 152(e), a "child" is defined as "an individual who ... is a son,
stepson, daughter, or stepdaughter of the taxpayer." See id. § 151(c)(3).
21. Id. § 152(e).
22. Id.
23. Section 152(a) defines "dependent" as "[an] individual[] over half of whose sup
port, for ... the taxable year of the taxpayer ... , [is] received from the taxpayer." Id.
§ 152(a).
24. I.R.C. § 151 (1988) provides in pertinent part:

62

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

A.

Dependent Child Exemption Requirements Prior to the 1984
Amendment to lR.C § 152(e)

[Vol. 14:S9

Prior to its amendment in 1984, section IS2(e) permitted the par
ent who had custody for the greater portion of the year to claim the
dependency exemption. 2s However, there were three exceptions that
would enable a party other than the custodial parent to claim the ex
emption. 26 The first exception applied where a decree of divorce, a
(a) Allowance of deductions
In the case of an individual, the exemptions provided by this section shall be
allowed as deductions in computing taxable income.
(c) Additional exemption for dependents
(1) In general
An exemption of the exemption amount for each dependent (as defined in
section IS2)
(B) who is a child of the taxpayer and who (i) has not attained the age of
19 at the close of the calendar year in which the taxable year of the taxpayer
begins, or (ii) is a student who has not attained the age of 24 at the close of
such calendar year.

Id.
2S. Act of Aug. 31, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-78, § IS2(e), 81 Stat. 191, 191 (current
version at I.R.C. § IS2(e) (1988». Section IS2(e) provided in pertinent part:
(e) SUPPORT TEST IN CASE OF CHILD OF DIVORCED PARENTS, ETC.
(1) GENERAL RULE.-If
(A) a child (as defined in section ISI(e)(3» receives over half of his sup
port during the calendar year from his parents who are divorced or legally
separated under a decree of divorce or separate maintenance, or who are
separated under a written separation agreement, and
(B) such child is in the custody of one or both of his parents for more
than one-half of the calendar year,
such child shall be treated, for purposes of subsection (a), as receiving over half of
his support during the calendar year from the parent having custody for a greater
portion of the calendar year unless he is treated, under the provisions of para
graph (2), as having received over half of his support for such year from the other
parent (referred to in this subsection as the parent not having custody).

Id. Custodial parent in this context refers to the parent who has physical custody for the
greater portion of the year. See Nancy 1. Brown, Comment, Domestic Relations Tax Re
form, 20 GONZ. L. REV. 2S1, 277 (198S).
26. § IS2(e), 81 Stat. at 191-92. Section IS2(e) provided in pertinent part:
(2) SPECIAL RULE.-The child of parents described in paragraph (1) shall be
treated as having received over half of his support during the calendar year
from the parent not having custody if
(A)(i) the decree of divorce or of separate maintenance, or a written
agreement between the parents applicable to the taxable year beginning in
such calendar year, provides that the parent not having custody shall be enti
tled to any deduction allowable under section lSI for such child, and
(ii) such parent not having custody provides at least $600 for the support
of such child during the calendar year, or
.
(B)(i) the parent not having custody provides $1,200 or more for the sup
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decree of separate maintenance, or a written agreement between the
parents stated that the noncustodial parent would be entitled to claim
the exemption provided the noncustodial parent contributed at least
$600 in child support27 for the taxable year. 28 The second exception
allowed the noncustodial parent to claim the exemption if he or she
contributed $1200 or more in child support for each child during the
taxable year provided the custodial parent contributed less than that
amount. 29 The third exception applied to multiple-support agree
ments establishing that someone other than the custodial parent would
be entitled to the exemption. 30 The first and second of these excep
tions were eliminated by the 1984 amendments to section 152(e).
port of such child (or if there is more than one such child, $1,200 or more for
each of such children) for the calen~ year, and
(ii) the parent having custody of such child does not clearly establish that
he provided more for the support of such child during the calendar year than
the parent not having custody.
For the purposes of this paragraph, amounts expended for the support of a child
or children shall be treated as received from the parent not having custody to the
extent that such parent provided amounts for such support.
(4) EXCEPTION FOR MULTIPLE-SUPPORT AGREEMENT.-The provisions of
this subsection shall not apply in any case where over half of the support of
the child is treated as having been received from a taxpayer under the provi
sions of subsection (c).

Id.
27. Problems arose over the difficulty in determining the definition of support. The
Treasury regulations provided a vague definition of support, which included "food, shelter,
clothing, medical and dental care, education, and the like." Deborah E. Behr, Comment,
Tax Planning in Divorce: Both Spouses Benefitfrom the Tax Reform Act of 1984,21 WIL
LAMElTE L. REv. 767, 803 (1985) (quoting Treas. Reg. § l.ls2-1(a)(2)(i) (1984». In addi
tion, courts generally defined support liberally. This led to much litigation over the
valuation of the support given to the child. Id. at 802·m..
28. § Is2(e)(2)(A), 81 Stat. at 191-92. This provision expressly permitted a state
court, in a divorce or separate maintenance decree, to allocate the dependent child exemp
tion to the noncustodial parent. See id. However, the current version of § Is2(e) does not
include language that would permit a state court to allocate the dependency exemption by
means of a decree of divorce or separation. See I.R.C. § Is2(e) (1988).
29. § Is2(e)(2)(B), 81 Stat. at 192, amended by Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-455, sec. 2139, § Is2(e)(2)(B)(i), 90 Stat. 1520, 1932. This provision permitted a non
custodial parent to claim the dependent child exemption if he or she contributed the requi
site amount toward the support of the child. See id. However, § Is2(e) as amended no
longer provides language that would permit the noncustodial parent to claim the depen
dency exemption based on the amount of his or her child support cOntribution. See I.R.C.
§ Is2(e) (1988).
30. § 152(e)(4), 81 Stat. at 192. This exception is preserved in the current version of
§ Is2(e). See I.R.C. § 152(e)(3) (1988). Multiple-support agreements are beyond the scope
of this Note and, therefore, will not be discussed further.
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Dependent Child Exemption Requirements After the 1984
Amendment to LR.C § 152(e)

Section 152(e) was amended by Congress pursuant to the Tax Re
form Act of 1984. 31 In the Committee Report on the Act, the Com
mittee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives stated that
it wished to change the provisions of section 152(e) so that disputes
regarding the dependent child exemption could be resolved without
the involvement of the Internal Revenue Service ("I.R.S.").32
Under the amended version of section 152(e),33 the dependent
child exemption is specifically allocated to the custodial parent regard
less of the amount of child support provided by the noncustodial par
ent. 34 There are, however, three exceptions to this general rule. 3s The
31. Tax Refonn Act of 1984, supra note 5. The provisions of the act became effec
tive January I, 1985.
32. The Committee Report, in the section entitled "Reasons for Change," stated:
The present rules governing the allocations of the dependency exemption are
often subjective and present difficult problems of proof and substantiation. The
Internal Revenue Service becomes involved in many disputes between parents
who both claim the dependency exemption based on providing support over the
applicable thresholds. The cost to the parties and the Government to resolve
these disputes is relatively high and the Government generally has little tax reve
nue at stake in the outcome. The committee wishes to provide more certainty by
allowing the custodial spouse the exemption unless that spouse waives his or her
right to claim the exemption. Thus, dependency disputes between parents will be
resolved without the involvement of the Internal Revenue Service.
H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 1498-99 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 697, 1140.
33. I.R.C. § IS2(e) (1988).
34. I.R.C. § IS2(e) provides in pertinent part:
(e) Support test in case of child of divorced parents, etc.
(I) Custodial parent gets exemption
Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, if
(A) a child (as defined in section ISI(c)(3» receives over half of his sup
port during the calendar year from his parents
(i) who are divorced or legally separated under a decree of divorce
or separate maintenance,
(ii) who are separated under a written separation agreement, or
(iii) who live apart at all times during the last 6 months of the calen
dar year, and
(B) such child is in the custody of one or both of his parents for more
than one-half of the calendar year,
such child shall be treated, for purposes of subsection (a), as receiving over
half of his support during the calendar year from the parent having custody
for the greater portion of the calendar year (hereinafter in this subsection
referred to as the 'custodial parent').

Id.
35. I.R.C. § IS2(e)(2)-(4) provides the following exceptions to the general rule that
the custodial parent is entitled to the dependency exemption:
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first exception requires that the custodial parent sign a written declara
tion 36 stating that he or she will not claim the dependency exemption.
(2) Exception where custodial parent releases claim to exemption for the year
A child of parents described in paragraph (1) shall be treated as having re
ceived over half of his support during a calendar year from the noncustodial par
ent if
(A) the custodial parent signs a written declaration (in such manner and
form as the Secretary may by regulations prescribe) that such custodial par
ent will not claim such child as a dependent for any taxable year beginning in
such calendar year, and
(B) the noncustodial parent attaches such written declaration to the non
custodial parent's return for the taxable year beginning during such calendar
year.
For purposes of this subsection, the term 'noncustodial parent' means the parent
who is not the custodial parent.
(3) Exception for mUltiple-support agreement
This subsection shall not apply in any case where over half of the support of
the child is treated as having been received from a taxpayer under the provisions
of subsection (c).
(4) Exception for certain pre-1985 instruments
(A) In general
A child of parents described in paragraph (1) shall be treated as having
received over half his support during a calendar year from the noncustodial
parent if
(i) a qualified pre-1985 instrument between the parents applicable
to the taxable year beginning in such calendar year provides that the
noncustodial parent shall be entitled to any deduction allowable
under section 151 for such child, and
(ii) the noncustodial parent provides at least $600 for the support
of such child during such calendar year.
For purposes of this subparagraph, amounts expended for the support of a
child or children shall be treated as received from the noncustodial parent to
the extent that such parent provided amounts for such support.
(B) Qualified pre-1985 instrument
For purposes of this paragraph, the term 'qualified pre-1985 instrument'
means any decree of divorce or separate maintenance or written agreement
(i) which is executed before January 1, 1985,
(ii) which on such date contains the provision described in sub
paragraph (A)(i), and
(iii) which is not modified on or after such date in a modification
which expressly provides that this paragraph shall not apply to such
decree or agreement.

Id.
36. This written declaration will be referred to in this Note as an exemption
"waiver"; it has been generally referred to as a waiver by courts that have ruled on this
issue. See, e.g., Lincoln v. Lincoln, 746 P.2d 13, 16 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987); Serrano v.
Serrano, 566 A.2d 413,414 (Conn. 1989); Hart v. Hart, 774 S.W.2d 455, 457 (Ky. Ct. App.
1989); McKenzie v. Jahnke, 432 N.W.2d 556, 557 (N.D. 1988); Hughes v. Hughes, 518
N.E.2d 1213, 1216 (Ohio), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 846 (1988); Brandriet v. Larsen, 442
N.W.2d 455, 456 (S.D. 1989); Sarver v. Dathe, 439 N.W.2d 548, 551 (S.D. 1989); Cross v.
Cross, 363 S.E.2d 449,456 (W. Va. 1987).
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This waiver allows the noncustodial parent to claim the exemption. 37
The second exception provides that a multiple-support agreement may
entitle someone other than the custodial parent to claim the exemp
tion. 38 The third exception provides that a qualified pre-1985 instru
ment may permit the noncustodial parent to claim the exemption. For
this last exception to apply, the noncustodial parent must also provide
at least $600 in support of the child during the calendar year.39
Hence, the amount of child support provided by the noncustodial
parent is no longer a factor in determining which parent may claim the
exemption. 40 Moreover, unlike pre-1984 section 152(e), section 152(e)
as amended no longer contains specific language that would permit a
court to allocate the exemption to the noncustodial parent through a
decree of divorce or of separate maintenance. 41 Section 152(e) now
allocates the dependent child exemption to the custodial parent unless
one of the exceptions enumerated in the section applies. Conse
quently, a state court's allocation of the exemption to a noncustodial
parent, in the absence of one of the section 152(e)(2)-(4) exceptions,
would appear to be in direct conflict with the plain language of section
152(e).
II.

A.

SARVER V. DATHE42

Facts

In Sarver, the plaintiff and defendant had been divorced pursuant
to a Judgment and Decree of Divorce issued by the Meade County
Circuit Court in 1979. Under the decree, the Meade County court
awarded custody of the sole child of the marriage to the plaintiff
mother and ordered the defendant father to pay child support. 43
In 1986, the plaintiff sought to modify the child support agree
ment44 and to secure an increase in the defendant's child support pay
37. I.R.C. § 152(e)(2) (1988). This exception is of primary concern in this Note.
The remaining exceptions, § 152(e)(3)-(4), are irrelevant to the topic of this Note because
the cases under review contain no agreements that might invoke those provisions. See id.
§ 152(e)(3)-(4).
38. Id. § 152(e)(3).
39. Id. § 152(e)(4).
40. See supra note 29.
41. See supra note 28.
42. 439 N.W.2d 548 (S.D. 1989).
43. Id. at 549.
44. Section 152(e)(4), which provides an exception to the general rule that the custo
dial parent is entitled to the dependent child exemption, is not applicable to the facts of the
Sarver case. See I.R.C. § 152(e)(4) (1988). Section 152(e)(4) states that a noncustodial
parent may claim the dependent child exemption if there exists a pre-1985 divorce decree
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ments by filing a Petition for Modification of Child Support with the
Department of Social Services ("DSS"). The DSS granted this peti
tion and approved a subsequent request by the plaintiff for a further
increase in the defendant's child support payments. 45 The defendant
responded by filing a motion requesting that the Mead County court
set aside the latter increase and award him the dependent child exemp
tion. Subsequently, the court granted the defendant's requests. 46 The
plaintiff's subsequent motion for rehearing by the Meade County
court was denied, and the plaintiff appealed. 47
B.

Holding and Analysis

The South Dakota Supreme Court held that the circuit court
erred in allocating the dependent child exemption to the defendant
noncustodial parent. 48 The South Dakota Supreme Court interpreted
the provisions ofsection 152(e)49 as specifically allocating the depend
ent child exemption to the custodial parent, subject to three excep
tions. The court noted that for any of these exceptions to be invoked,
a written document must exist. This document may be a written dec
laration that the custodial parent will not claim the exemption, 50 a
multiple-support agreement that allocates the exemption to someone
other than the custodial parent,51 or a qualified pre-1985 instrument
that allocates the exemption to the noncustodial parent. 52 Because no
such documents existed, the court found that none of the exceptions to
section 152(e) were applicable. Consequently, the court concluded
that the custodial parent was entitled to the exemption and that the
circuit court had erred in allocating the exemption to the noncustodial
parent.53
Next, the Sarver court addressed the issue of whether a state
or written agreement stating that the noncustodial parent would be entitled to the exemp
tion. Id. In Sarver, the parties' 1979 divorce decree and child support agreement made no
reference to the dependent child exemption. See Sarver, 439 N.W.2d at 551.
45. Sarver, 439 N.W.2d at 549.
46. Id. at 549-50. The circuit court did not order the plaintiff custodial parent to
sign a written declaration that she would not claim the dependent child exemption; the
court merely declared that the defendant noncustodial parent was entitled to the exemp
tion. Id. at 550-51.
47. Id. at 550.
48. Id. at 551.
49. I.R.C. § 152(e) (1988).
50. See id. § 152(e)(2).
51. See id. § 152(e)(3).
52. See id. § 152(e)(4).
53. Sarver v. Dathe, 439 N.W.2d 548, 551 (S.D. 1989). The South Dakota Supreme
Court apparently viewed a state court's allocation of the dependency exemption to a non
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court could order a custodial parent to execute a section 152(e)(2) ex
emption waiver54 and thereby reallocate the dependent child exemp
tion to the noncustodial parent. 55 The Sarver court insisted that the
actions of those state courts which attempted to:
override federal tax law by ordering custodial parents to execute an
exemption waiver and thus qualify noncustodial parents under 26
U.S.C. section 152(e)(2) [amounted to] ... an unconstitutional med
dling with Congressional authority granted under the Sixteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and, [is] therefore,
contrary to the Supremacy Clause of the [Constitution].56

Consequently, the South Dakota Supreme Court asserted that a state
court lacks the authority to grant the dependent child exemption to a
noncustodial parent without first obtaining the custodial parent's
consent. 57
Two justices concurred with the Sarver majority. Justice Mor
gan, in his concurring opinion, expressed his support for the view that
custodial parent as being in direct conflict with the express language of § I 52(e). See I.R.C.
§ 152(e) (1988); see also supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
The Sarver court also cited State v. Dryden, 409 N.W.2d 648 (S.D. 1987), as precedent
for its holding. In Dryden, the South Dakota Supreme Court noted that the amended
version of § 152(e) divested state courts of their authority to allocate the dependent child
exemption. Id. at 652 n.2.
54. I.R.C. § 152(e)(2) (1988).
55. The facts in Sarver did not compel the Sarver court to address this issue.
Although the Meade County court awarded the dependent child exemption to the noncus
todial parent, the court did not implement that decision by ordering the custodial parent to
execute a § 152(e)(2) exemption waiver. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
However, the South Dakota Supreme Court later confronted this issue in Brandriet v.
Larsen, 442 N.W.2d 455 (S.D. 1989), which was decided two months after Sarver. In
Brandriet the court held that a state court may not order a custodial parent to execute a
§ 152(e)(2) exemption waiver because Congress had contemplated a "voluntary" waiver.
Id. at 459.
It should be noted that although Sarver and Brandriet are similar in result, the analy
ses applied by the South Dakota Supreme Court in the two cases differ. The Brandriet
decision focuses on the "voluntary" nature of the waiver, while the Sarver decision focuses
on federal preemption analysis.
56. Sarver, 439 N.W.2d at 551-52 (citations omitted).
57. Id. at 552. The Sarver court expressed its agreement with the Michigan Court of
Appeals' assertion in Varga v. Varga, 434 N.W.2d 152 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988), that:
[A] trial court [is] without authority to order that [a noncustodial parent] is enti
tled to claim the deduction without obtaining [the custodial parent's] consent.
[A] court could, however, consider which parent had the benefit of the exemption
under the amended tax statute and its effect on the parties [sic] ability to pay as
relevant factors in deciding the amount [of child support to be provided by the
noncustodial parent].
Sarver, 439 N.W.2d at 552 (citing Varga, 434 N.W.2d at ISS-56). The Sarver court's
agreement with this assertion suggests its belief that § 152(e), as amended, confers a tax
benefit upon custodial parents. See infra notes 94-110 and accompanying text.
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a state court may not allocate the exemption by ordering the custodial
parent to execute a section 152(e)(2) exemption waiver. 58 Justice Mor
gan cited as support for this view the Committee Report on the Tax
Reform Act of 1984, which states:
For this exception to apply, the custodial parent will have to sign a
written declaration that he or she will not claim the child as a de
pendent for the year, and the noncustodial parent will have to at
tach the written declaration to his or her tax return. That
declaration may be made for one or more specified calendar years.
The parties may make a permanent declaration a copy of which the
noncustodial parent attaches to each year's return, or the declara
tion may be made by the custodial spouse annually in order to better
insure the receipt of child support payments. 59

Justice Morgan emphasized the Ways and Means Committee's state
ment that the custodial parent had the option of annually executing
the waiver "in order to better insure the receipt of child support pay
ments."60 Apparently, Justice Morgan perceived this statement as
evincing the Ways and Means Committee's desire to enable a custodial
parent to use the dependent child exemption as an inducement for the
noncustodial parent to fulfill his or her child support obligation. He
thought that permitting a state court to order the custodial parent to
execute the waiver would divest the custodial parent of sole control
over the waiver and thereby negate the custodial parent's ability to use
the exemption as an inducement. Therefore, he concluded that Con
gress did not intend to vest a state court with the power to allocate the
exemption. 61
Justice Sabers, in his concurring opinion, agreed with the major
ity's assertion that the trial court could reduce the noncustodial par
ent's child support obligation by an amount equal to the value of the
dependent child exemption. 62 However, he maintained that "trial
courts have inherent authority to order the custodial parent to execute
[a section 152(e)(2) exemption waiver] ... because the tax exemption
is part of the child support issue. "63 The Connecticut Supreme Court,
in Serrano v. Serrano,64 took a position similar to this view. 65
58. Sarver, 439 N.W.2d at 553 (Morgan, J., concurring specially).
59. [d. at 553 (quoting the section of the Committee Report entitled "Explanation of
Provision," H.R. REP. No. 432, supra note 32, at 1499, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
1140-41).
60. [d.
.61. [d.
62. [d. at 554 (Sabers, J., concurring specially).
63. [d. (citations omitted).
64. 566 A.2d 413 (Conn. 1989).
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SERRANO V. SERRAN066

Facts

In Serrano, the trial court dissolved the parties' marriage; ordered
the plaintiff to pay child support to the defendant, the custodial par
ent;67 and allocated the dependent child exemption to the plaintiff. 68
To implement its decision and to ensure that its allocation of the ex
emption to the plaintiff noncustodial parent would not conflict with
section 152(e), the trial court ordered the defendant custodial parent
to execute annually a section 152(e)(2) exemption waiver.69
The defendant asserted that this order was invalid, arguing that
upon enactment of the 1984 amendments to section 152(e)1° Congress
had preempted the authority of a state court to allocate the dependent
child exemption. Moreover, the defendant maintained that Congress,
in enacting the amendments to section 152(e), intended to confer a tax
benefit upon the custodial parent. However, Congress intended to
confer this benefit to the noncustodial parent only if the custodial par
ent "voluntarily" consented to its transfer. It followed, the defendant
argued, that the trial court's order conflicted with congressional intent
and was invalid. 71
65. See id. at 417-18; see also infra text accompanying note 88.
66. 566 A.2d 413 (Conn. 1989).
67. The trial court granted the plaintiff and defendant joint custody of their child. In
a joint custody arrangement such as this, the defendant, with whom the child was to reside,
would be considered the custodial parent under § 152(e)(1)(B). See I.R.C. § 152(e)(I)(B)
(1988). This section refers to the custodial parent as "the parent having custody for a
greater portion of the calendar year." Id. In this context, custody seems to be equated
with physical custody. Brown, supra note 25, at 280-81.
68. Serrano, 566 A.2d at 414.
69. Id. Compliance with the language of § 152(e) required that the trial court order
the defendant to execute a § 152(e)(2) exemption waiver. See I.R.C. § 152(e) (1988). Sec
tion 152(e)(I) specifically allocates the exemption to the custodial parent. Id. § 152(e)(1).
However, § 152(e)(2) states that if the custodial parent executes an exemption waiver, the
noncustodial parent may claim the exemption. Id. § 152(e)(2).
70. Tax Reform Act of 1984, supra note 5.
71. Serrano, 566 A.2d at 415. The defendant also argued that the trial court's alloca
tion of the dependent child exemption to the plaintiff was an exercise of its equitable powers
that could have been avoided. She maintained that the court could have resorted to a less
intrusive legal remedy, namely, reducing the plaintiff's child support payments by the value
of the exemption to the plaintiff. Id. at 418. In response, the Connecticut Supreme Court
noted that "actions for dissolution of marriage are inherently equitable proceedings," and
that a court's use of its "broad equitable power" is often essential to fashioning a "just
remedy." Id. (citations omitted). Furthermore, the court pointed out that the trial court
exercised its equitable powers appropriately, considering the facts of the case. The defend
ant, a welfare recipient, had no income against which to apply the exemption. In addition,
the state would be reimbursed for the welfare payments to the defendant out of the plain
tiff's support payments. Consequently, reducing the plaintiff's support payments, instead
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B. Holding and Analysis
The Connecticut Supreme Court disagreed with the defendant
and held that section 152(e), as amended in 1984, does not preempt a
state court from allocating the dependent child exemption to the non
custodial parent. 72 The court began its analysis by noting that the de
termination of whether a federal law preempts a state law is a federal
question arising under the Supremacy Clause73 of the Constitution. 74
Consequently, the court examined United States Supreme Court pre
cedent to determine whether section 152(e), as amended, preempts a
state court's authority to allocate the dependency exemption.
The court relied primarily on Northwest Central Pipeline Corp. v.
State Corp. Commission of Kansas 7S for guidance regarding federal
preemption analysis. Citing Northwest Central, the Connecticut
Supreme Court stated that, ultimately, it must be determined whether
Congress has exercised its power under the Supremacy Clause to pre
empt the state law. 76 Absent explicit language or statements revealing
Congress' intent to preempt the state law, such intent may be inferred
where:
Congress has legislated comprehensively to occupy an entire field of
regulation, leaving no room for the States to supplement federal
law, or where the state law at issue conflicts with federal law, either
because it is impossible to comply with both, or because the state
law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
of granting him the exemption, would have placed a greater burden on the state. Finally,
the court opined that the trial court's ruling provided "an incentive for the plaintiff to keep
current in his support payments since the defendant [could] refuse to execute [the exemp
tion waiver] for any tax year during which the plaintiff has failed to make support pay
ments." Id.
72. Id. at 415, 418.
73. U.S. CoNST. art. VI, cl. 2.
74. Serrano, 566 A.2d at 415.
75. 489 U.S. 493 (1989). In Northwest Central, the Supreme Co!lrt held that the
Federal Natural Gas Act did not preempt a Kansas law that regulated the production of
natural gas. Id. at 519-22. The Federal Natural Gas Act provided for federal regulation of
the cost of natural gas. Id. at 506-07. However, the Kansas law also regulated the cost of
natural gas by threatening the cimcellation of a natural gas producer's entitlement to as
signed quantities of gas if "production [were] too long delayed." Id. at 497. The Supreme
Court held that although the Kansas law indirectly affected the cost of natural gas, it was
not preempted by the federal act. Id. at 516. The Court found that it was possible to
comply with both the federal and the state law, that the state statute did not prevent the
attainment of the goals of the federal act, and that the statute achieved a proper state
purpose. Consequently, the Supreme Court concluded that the statute was not preempted.
Id. at 516-19.
76. Serrano, 566 A.2d at 415.
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congressional objectives. 77
The Connecticut Supreme Court found no explicit congressional
intention to preempt a state court's authority to allocate the dependent
child exemption. Neither the legislative history of the amendments to
section 152(e) nor the post-1984 amendment language of the statute
revealed any explicit language or statements forbidding a state court
from allocating the dependency exemption. 78 Moreover, the court
found no congressional intent to regulate the entire field of domestic
relations.79
Furthermore, the Connecticut Supreme Court found that it is
possible for a custodial parent to comply with both section 152(e) and
a state court order that allocates the dependency exemption by order
ing the custodial parent to execute a section 152(e)(2) exemption
waiver. Had this been impossible, a congressional intent to preempt
state courts' authority to allocate the dependent child exemption could
have been inferred. 80
The Connecticut Supreme Court noted that the only disputed
question was whether the trial court's order stood as an obstacle to the
objectives sought by Congress in amending section 152(e).81 However,
the court noted that because the states have traditionally regulated the
field of domestic relations, "the standard for demonstrating a preempt
ing conflict between federal law and a state domestic relations provi
sion is high ...."82 The United States Supreme Court articulated this
standard in United States v. Yazell,83 where it held that a federal law
will preempt state family law "only where clear and substantial inter
77. Id. (citations omitted).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. [d. In contrast, had the trial court simply stated in its order that the noncus
todial parent may claim the exemption, compliance with both § I 52(e) and the order would
have been impossible because § I 52(e) specifically allocates the exemption to the custodial
parent. See I.R.C. § 152(e) (1988). However, this impossibility is removed when a trial
court rules that the noncustodial parent may claim the exemption and orders the custodial
parent to execute an exemption waiver. This is so, because § I 52(e)(2) permits the noncus
todial parent to claim the exemption if the custodial parent executes an exemption waiver.
See id. § 152(e)(2).
81. Serrano, 566 A.2d at 415.
82. Id.
83. 382 U.S. 341 (1966). In Yazell, the federal government sought to enforce a
promissory note signed by the defendants husband and wife who received a Small Business
Administration disaster loan. Upon default, the government attempted to collect the defi
ciency from the defendant wife's separate property. The Supreme Court held that the fed
eral government's interest in collecting on a negotiable debt did not override Texas law,
which provided that "a married woman could not bind her separate property unless she
had first obtained a court decree removing her disability to contract." Id. at 343.
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ests of the National Government, which cannot be served consistently
with respect for such state interests, will suffer major damage if the
state law is applied."84
The Serrano court therefore asked whether the trial court's rul
ing, which ordered the custodial parent to execute a section 152(e)(2)
exemption waiver, inflicted "major damage" upon the federal interests
that Congress sought to achieve in amending section 152(e). To an
swer this question the court first attempted to determine the relevant
federal interest Congress wished to achieve. The defendant argued
that Congress sought to confer a tax benefit upon the custodial parent
by specifically allocating the dependent child exemption to the custo
dial parent. The argument in support of this view is that if Congress
had intended to allow a state court to transfer this tax benefit to the
noncustodial parent, Congress would have provided explicit language
to this effect in the 1984 amendments to section 152(e).8s The defend
ant also noted that the pre-1984 version of section IS2(e) contained
language permitting a state court, through a decree of divorce or of
separate maintenance, to allocate the exemption;86 however, no such
language exists in the amended version. 87
The Serrano court, however, rejected the defendant's argument,
because the argument failed to recognize that state courts had been
allocating the exemption "for decades," long before the I.R.S. made
explicit reference to the practice in the first version of section 152(e) in
1967. 88 Instead, the Serrano court asserted that the pertinent federal
interest was Congress' desire to remove the I.R.S. from "disputes be
tween parents who both claim the dependency exemption."89
After identifying the federal interest as Congress' desire to ex
clude the I.R.S. from disputes pertaining to the dependent child ex
emption, the Serrano court determined that the trial court's order did
not do "major damage" to this interest. The Serrano court found no
major damage because the trial court's order did not conflict with
84. Id. at 352 (emphasis added).
85. See Se"ano, 566 A.2d at 416-17.
86. See Act of Aug. 31,1967, Pub. L. No. 90-78, § 152(e)(2)(A)(i), 81 Stat. 191, 191
92 (current version at I.R.C. § 152(e) (1988».
87. Se"ano, 566 A.2d at 416-17; see I.R.C. § 152(e) (1988).
88. Serrano, 566 A.2d at 417.
89. Id. at 417-18 (quoting the section of the Committee Report entitled "Reasons for
Change," H.R. REP; No. 432, supra note 32, at 1498, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
1140). For a discussion concerning the appropriateness of reliance on the "Reasons for
Change" portion of committee reports when determining congressional intent, see Michael
Livingston, Congress, the Courts, and the Code: Legislative History and the Interpretation of
Tax Statutes, 69 TEX. L. REV. 819, 878-87 (1991).
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Congress' goal of removing the I.R.S. from these disputes. 90 Congress
achieved this goal by eliminating from section 152(e) the exceptions
requiring a determination of the amount of child support contributed
by each parent. 91 The trial court's order, effectively allocating the ex
emption to the noncustodial parent, did not involve the I.R.S., and
therefore, did not contravene Congress' purpose.92
In sum, the Serrano court's federal preemption analysis revealed
no conflict between section 152(e) and the trial court's order. Conse
quently, the court concluded that section 152(e) does not preempt a
state court's authority to allocate the dependent child exemption. 93
IV.

ANALYSIS

The Sarver court and the Serrano court reached different conclu
sions concerning whether section 152(e) preempts a state court's au
thority to allocate the dependent child exemption to the noncustodial
parent by ordering the custodial parent to execute an exemption
waiver. The Sarver court's reasoning implicitly suggested that section
152(e) preempts a state court's authority to order the waiver because
the order does major damage to Congress' intent to confer a tax bene
fit upon custodial parents. 94 Conversely, the Serrano court argued
against preemption because the state court order does not affect Con
gress' intent to remove the I.R.S. from disputes regarding the exemp
tion. 95 Essentially, the Sarver court and the Serrano court disagree on
what Congress intended to achieve in amending section 152(e). Con
sequently, a resolution of this issue will determine whether the Sarver
court's view or the Serrano court's view should prevail. 96 '
Serrano, 566 A.2d at 418.
See supra notes 31-41 and accompanying text.
Serrano, 566 A.2d at 418.
93. Id.
94. See supra note 57 and accompanying text; see also Motes v. Motes, 786 P.2d 232,
238 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), cert. denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990) (citing Sarver as pro
posing that the dependent child exemption confers a financial benefit in the form of a reduc
tion in taxable income).
95. See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
96. If in amending § 152(e) Congress intended to confer a tax benefit upon custodial
parents, a state court order that allocates the dependency exemption to the noncustodial
parent does major damage to this congressional intent. Hence, pursuant to the "major
damage" preemption standard promulgated by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966), § 152(e) as amended would preempt a state court's au
thority to make such an allocation. See David J. Benson, The Power of State Courts to
Award the Federal Dependency Exemption Upon Divorce, 16 U. DAYTON L. REV. 29, 39
(1990); James A. Rodenberg, Note, AI/ocating Federal Income Tax Dependency Exemp
tions in Divorce Decrees, 55 Mo. L. REV. 1075, 1084 (1990); see also supra notes 77-84 and
accompanying text. If, however, Congress' sole intent was to remove the I.R.S. from dis
90.

91.
92.
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There are two arguments which support the Sarver court's view
that the 1984 amendments to section IS2(e) evince a congressional in
tent to confer a tax benefit upon the custodial parent. The first is that
Congress specifically allocated the dependent child exemption to the
custodial parent, and the noncustodial parent can receive the exemp
tion only if the custodial· parent voluntarily relinquishes his or her
right to the exemption by executing a section IS2(e)(2) exemption
waiver.97 The second argument is that, unlike the pre-1984 version of
section IS2(e), the amended version contains no language authorizing
a state court to allocate the dependent child exemption. 98
The Sarver court's reasoning follows the voluntary relinquish
ment argument. The court interpreted the section IS2(e)(2) exemp
tion waiver as voluntary and concluded that a state court may not
allocate the dependency exemption to the noncustodial parent without
obtaining the custodial parent's consent.99 The South Dakota
Supreme Court, in Brandriet v. Larsen, 100 reached a similar result in
reliance on the Committee Report on the Tax Reform Act of 1984.101
The Report stated that the custodial parent would have the option of
executing the section IS2(e)(2) exemption waiver yearly, to ensure that
the noncustodial parent complies with his or her child support obliga
tions.102 The Brandriet court interpreted this statement as contem
plating a voluntary waiver because state court authority to order a
permanent waiver would divest the custodial parent of his or her op
tion to execute the waiver yearly.103
Nevertheless, there is some evidence that Congress did not intend
the section IS2(e)(2) exemption waiver to be executed only voluntar
ily. Congress made no explicit statement that it intended the exemp
tion waiver to be only voluntary, and section IS2(e) does not explicitly
state that the custodial parent must execute the exemption waiver
voluntarily.
putes involving the dependency exemption, § 152(e) as amended does not preempt a state
court from allocating the exemption to the noncustodial parent as the allocation does not
involve the I.R.S. in such disputes. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
97. See I.R.C. § 152(e) (1988).
98. See Act of Aug. 31, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-78, § 152(e)(2)(A)(i), 81 Stat. 191,191
92 (current version at I.R.C. § 152(e) (1988»; I.R.C. § 152(e) (1988).
99. Sarver v. Dathe, 439 N.W.2d 548, 552 (S.D. 1989).
100. 442 N.W.2d 455 (S.D. 1989).
101. H.R. REP. No. 432, supra note 32, at 1499, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
1140.

102. Id.; see also supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
103. Brandriet, 442 N.W.2d at 459.
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Yet, as Judge Wright, dissenting in Hughes v. Hughes,l04 noted,
the ordinary usage of the term "release" implies a voluntary relin
quishment, and it is "[a] fundamental canon of statutory construction
... that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking
their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning."lOs Hence, it ap
pears reasonable to interpret the release as voluntary in nature, and
consequently, the voluntary relinquishment argument is viable.
The second argument tending to support the view that Congress
intended to confer a tax benefit upon the custodial parent is that while
the amended version of section 152(e) specifically allocates the depen
dency exemption to the custodial parent, Congress deliberately omit
ted language that would have enabled a state court to allocate the
exemption to the noncustodial parent. 106 This deliberate omission ar
gument gains credibility from the fact that the pre-1984 version of sec
tion 152(e) contained language that permitted a state court to allocate
the dependent child exemption.107
Some state courts, however, have rejected this argument,108 as
serting that the omission merely "demonstrates Congress'[] surpass
ing indifference to how the exemption is allocated as long as the IRS
[does not] have to do the allocating."I09 These courts seem to suggest
that Congress' failure to explicitly authorize state court allocation of
the exemption was merely an oversight, and that Congress assumed
section 152(e), as amended, would continue to be interpreted as per
mitting such allocation.
This response fails to consider the relevance of section 152(e)(4),
which explicitly states that only "pre-1985" divorce decrees allocating
the dependent child exemption to the noncustodial parent are recog
nized under the amended version of section 152(e).l10 The provision
does not attest to Congress' "surpassing indifference"; but rather, it
demonstrates a deliberate intention by Congress to omit from section
152(e) language that would recognize post-1985 divorce decrees. The
104. 518 N.E.2d 1213 (Ohio), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 846 (1988).
105. Id. at 1216-17 (Wright, J., dissenting) (quoting Perrin V. United States, 444
U.S. 37, 42 (1979».
106. See I.R.C. § 152(e) (1988).
107. See Act of Aug. 31, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-78, § 152(e)(2)(A)(i), 81 Stat. 191,
191-92 (current version at I.R.C. § 152(e) (1988».
108. See, e.g., Wassif V. Wassif, 551 A.2d 935, 940 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), cert. de
nied, 556 A.2d 674 (Md. 1989); Motes V. Motes, 786 P.2d 232, 236 (Utah Ct. App. 1989),
cert. denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990); Cross V. Cross, 363 S.E.2d 449,457 (W. Va.
1987).
109. Cross, 363 S.E.2d at 457.
110. I.R.C. § 152(e)(4) (1988).

19921

DEPENDENT CHILD EXEMPTION

77

fact that language allowing state courts to allocate the exemption no
longer exists thus demonstrates congressional intent to prohibit state
courts from allocating the exemption. Hence, the Sarver court's view
that Congress intended to confer a tax benefit upon the custodial par
ent by amending section 152(e) seems more persuasive than the Ser
rano court's view.
CONCLUSION

State courts may no longer allocate the dependent child exemp
tion. Prior to its amendment in 1984, section 152(e) contained lan
guage that permitted a state court to allocate the dependency
exemption to either the custodial or the noncustodial parent. How
ever, the amended version of section 152(e) specifically allocates the
exemption to the custodial parent unless he or she executes a written
declaration entitling the noncustodial parent to claim the exemption.
Moreover, the amended statute makes no reference to any state court
authority to allocate the dependent child exemption. Consequently,
the language of the statute no longer explicitly permits a state court to
allocate the dependency exemption.
Furthermore, a state court may not attempt to reallocate the de
pendency exemption to the noncustodial parent by ordering the custo
dial parent to execute a written declaration releasing his or her right to
the exemption. As the Sarver court's reasoning suggests, the 1984
amendments to section 152(e) evince a congressional intent to confer a
tax benefit upon custodial parents. Consequently, because a state
court's reallocation of the dependency exemption does major damage
to Congress' intent to confer a tax benefit upon custodial parents, sec
tion 152(e) must be interpreted to preempt such state court action.11l
Rodney V. Nutt

Ill. This conclusion that Congress had a deliberate intent to confer a tax benefit
upon custodial parents makes it clear that such a congressional intention would be under
mined by permitting state courts to allocate the exemption to the noncustodial parent.
Under traditional preemption analysis whenever "clear and substantial interests of the Na
tional Government ... will suffer major damage if the state law is applied," preemption will
be found. United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966).

